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Abstract 
This multi-authored piece conducts an interdisciplinary analysis of the fields and principles which 
could be relevant to securing access to climate change technologies, while at the same time 
encouraging the initial development of the technologies. The paper is the first part of a project funded 
by the British Academy, ‘Obtaining, protecting and using essential environmental technologies: a 
holistic analysis’. 
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Introductory Note1 
 
Technology and innovation have played an increasing role in the work of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (‘UNFCCC’).2 There is potential for technology 
to contribute to two key elements of responding to climate change: mitigating its impact (eg 
using renewable energies), forms of adapting behaviours to respond to and tolerate the impact 
of climate change (eg new seeds which can be used in different conditions), and also for 
technology to contribute to new means of obtaining and disseminating information about 
climate change and its impact.3 An exploration of the relationship between technology and 
climate change also raises questions of funding, other forms of regulation, sharing of 
technology, reward of innovators and how best to bring about an equitable outcome.4  
 
The UNFCCC’s work on technology has been led by the Expert Group on Technology 
Transfer (‘EGTT’) which was established in 2001. Technology acquired a more central role 
with the Bali Action Plan of 2007.5 This established the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-
Term Co-operative Action under the Convention. Draft documents of this body generated 
prior to its meetings at Copenhagen in December 20096 and in Bonn in June 20107 address 
technology, intellectual property (‘IP’) and approaches which could be taken to IP in seeking 
to achieve the Bali objectives regarding technology transfer. 
 
As is considered in more detail later in this paper, however, the place of IP in the UNFCCC 
remains unclear. This also begs a deeper question: what is the importance of IP in 
encouraging innovation and investment in it regarding mitigation, adaptation and information 
                                                
1 All weblinks are accurate as at early October 2010. Note that all contributions represent the personal views of 
the authors, rather than any organisation with which they are linked. Many thanks to Katie Fitzgerald and Lorna 
Gallacher, both of the University of Edinburgh, for their support and assistance. Valuable contributions to our 
discussions were made by Mervyn Jones of Aquamarine Power and Navraj Singh Ghaleigh, University of 
Edinburgh.  
2 See website http://unfccc.int/2860.php. 
3 See remit of Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
http://www.ipcc.ch/working_groups/working_groups.htm; Working II focuses on adaptation, Working Group 
III focuses on mitigation and the Task Group on Data and Scenario Support for Impacts and Climate Analysis is 
based on information.  
4 For this last issue, see eg Davies, A. ‘Rescaling Climate Justice: sub-national issues and innovations for low 
carbon futures’ accessible via http://regulation.upf.edu/index.php?id=dublin_2010. 
5 See http://unfccc.int/meetings/cop_13/items/4049.php. 
6 See Non paper 47 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/ad_hoc_working_groups/lca/application/pdf/awglcattnp47061109.pdf 
7 Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention, Tenth Session, Bonn 11 
June 2010, FCCC/AWGLCA/2010/6 see 
http://unfccc.int/documentation/documents/advanced_search/items/3594.php?rec=j&priref=600005797#beg. 
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provision in respect of climate change? Are the appropriate questions being asked by the 
relevant international bodies? Funding has graciously been provided by the British Academy 
to Dr Abbe Brown of the University of Edinburgh for a project ‘Obtaining, protecting and 
using essential environmental technologies: a holistic approach.’ This seeks to identify the 
impact of IP in relation to climate change and then to evaluate how, if necessary, the power 
of the IP owner could be managed.8  
 
Since 2008, this issue has been receiving increasing attention not only from the UNFCCC 
bodies but also from academics and policymakers.9 In preparation for the first expert meeting 
of the British Academy funded project, Dr Brown explored the basic principles, literature and 
possible arguments relating to IP and climate change, and some other disciplines which 
should form part of the discussion, in her working paper ‘Securing Access to Climate Change 
Technologies: Answers and Questions’.10 
 
The questions of access to essential technologies, and the place of IP, were explored at the 
first meeting of the project. This was an invitation only gathering of experts from the wide 
range of relevant fields, including competition law, human rights law and corporate social 
responsibility, which were considered to be relevant to the holistic scope pursued by the 
project. The participants, some of whom attended in person and some remotely, were Dr 
Abbe Brown, Navraj Singh Ghaleigh, Professor Anna Davies, Baskut Tuncak, David 
McGrory, Professor Keith Culver, Jon Santamauro, Associate Professor Estelle Derclaye, 
Associate Professor Kathryn McMahon, Mervyn Jones, Dr Suzanne Kingston, Douglas 
Taylor, Dr Elisa Morgera and Dr Kati Kulovesi.11  
 
As a means of stimulating our first discussions, all experts gave a presentation in response to 
the following (deliberately vague and controversial) motion: ‘Technologies which are 
                                                
8 The aims and objectives of the project can be found at 
http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/essentialtechnologies/detailsoftheproject.aspx.   
9 See eg The Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Action Under the Convention, ‘Ideas and Proposals on 
Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan,’ FCCC/AWGLCA/16/Rev.1 [2008], Copenhagen Economics (2009) ‘Are 
IPR a Barrier to the Transfer of Climate Change Technology’ 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/february/tradoc_142371.pdf cf Lee, B. et al (2009) ‘Who Owns Our 
Low Carbon Future? Intellectual Property and Energy Technologies’ Chatham House 
www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/14699_r0909_lowcarbonfuture.pdf. 
10 Brown, A.E.L. ‘Securing access to climate change technologies: answers and questions’, University of 
Edinburgh School of Law Working Paper Series (SSRN, 2010) 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1622024.  
11 For fuller details of participants and the breadth of expertise, see 
http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/essentialtechnologies/events.aspx. 
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essential to address climate change should be made available to all’. Copies of power-point 
presentations, and written summaries (together with other information relating to the project) 
can be found on the project website: http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/essentialtechnologies/.  
 
Deep discussion and questioning followed each presentation, following the Chatham House 
principle for those that wished to avail themselves of it, and a full and confidential note was 
taken. Although all the participants did not agree in relation to all issues, there was a strong 
sense of agreement as to important themes, and as to the other disciplines which should be 
asked to form part of the ongoing work of the project. All those listed as authors have 
expressed views that have been incorporated into this working paper. Inevitably, the final 
paper does not represent the agreed views of these authors; it provides, however, an agreed 
overview of the points raised in the June 2010 meeting, and of the arguments explored and 
positions put forward. The meeting, discussions, and the successful collaboration in relation 
to this piece suggests that, despite differences in viewpoints, it is indeed possible for a 
holistic approach to be taken to obtaining, protecting and using essential environmental 
technologies and for a broad ranging debate to continue.  
 
We have all learned a great deal from our discussions, from the opportunity to reflect upon 
one’s ideas when these are challenged from the perspective of an apparently unrelated 
discipline and also from discussion of arguments from different jurisdictions and of the extent 
to which they may suggest avenues to be pursued elsewhere. If anyone would like to become 
involved in the project, or would like further information, they are welcome to contact Dr 
Brown at abbe.brown@ed.ac.uk. The next step in the project will be a further expert meeting 
in December 2010, at which more detailed papers will be presented developing in greater 
depth the points explored here, and which will form the base for a scholarly edited collection. 
For now, all comments on the work done so far are most welcome.  
 
How important is IP in responding to climate change? 
 
If groundbreaking and unique technology is developed which can have a significant impact 
on mitigation, adaptation or information provision in relation to climate change; and if a 
patent is obtained in respect of it; then this would lead to the patent owner having the ability 
to exclude others from making or using that technology. This would mean that the patent 
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owner could control the use of technology which, if it was made available more widely, could 
offer greater benefits to society.  
 
Concern at the potential power of patent owners has already received significant attention in 
other industries, such as health, biotechnology and communications.12 
How apt is a comparison between these other fields and climate change technologies; can 
climate change technologies really be said to be ‘essential’? In relation to mitigation, the 
prevailing view from our discussions was that in most cases, the comparison is not fitting. 
Firstly, there are alternative sources of renewable energy. The power of a patent owner is 
limited to the technology which is the subject of the patent; a wave-power related patent 
would control only the invention in question, not all innovation in the wave sector, and not all 
renewable technologies. Even if a patent had been obtained at the birth of harnessing wave 
power in the 1970s,13 this would not have an adverse impact on the ability of innovators and 
business to work in other sectors of renewable energy, for example wind power.14  
 
Secondly, patents are national rights. Thus, even if one patent owner owned all patents in 
relation to wave power in the UK, this would not in itself enable it to control work in wave 
technologies, throughout the world.15 Even if a patent owner did own patents for these wave-
power technologies in several countries, then, given the point made above, other forms of 
renewable technologies could still be explored in those countries, and may indeed be more 
suitable as a result of geographical differences—say, Wind Power in Continental Europe or 
Anaerobic Digestion, used to produce Biogas, in China.  
 
Thirdly, studies regarding technologies and climate change suggest that more than one 
technology will continue to be relevant. The McKinsey Curve16 sets out the deployment cost 
                                                
12 For wide and deep discussion of this, see this important edited collection Maskus, K.E. and Reichman, J.H. 
(eds) (2005) International Public Goods and Transfer of Technology Under a Globalized Intellectual Property 
Regime Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.  
13 The Salter Duck, developed by Professor Steven Salter of the University of Edinburgh lay at the start of 
harnessing wave power. For more information, see http://www.technologystudent.com/energy1/tidal7.htm and 
http://www.mech.ed.ac.uk/research/wavepower/. 
14 See eg patent obtained by City University, London in 2010, see press report 
http://www.city.ac.uk/news/archive/2010/05_May/040510_1.html. 
15 See also discussion in Barton, J. (2007) ‘Intellectual Property and Access to Clean Energy Technologies in 
Developing Countries. An Analysis of Solar Photovoltaic, Biofuel and Wind Technologies’. 
http://ictsd.org/i/publications/3354/ and Srinivas, K.R. ‘Climate Change, Technology Transfer and Intellectual 
Property Rights’ RIS-EP #153 April 2009 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1440742. 
16 Enkvist, P.A., Naucler, T. And Rosander, J, ‘A Cost Curve for Greenhouse Gas Reduction,’ [2007] 1 
McKinsey Quarterly 35.  
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of a range of technologies necessary to reduce global warning by 2 degrees centigrade by 
2030, and suggests that all options should be explored for there to be a prospect of emissions 
being reduced.17 Yet a 2010 study should also be borne in mind, as it argued that the public is 
more likely to respond to new technologies (eg buy more efficient light bulbs) rather than 
make changes to their own behaviour (eg turn out the lights).18  
 
This discussion suggests that new technologies can make a contribution in relation to 
mitigation, even if they are not essential. Yet it can be argued that it is indeed appropriate to 
use the term ‘essential technologies’ in relation to mitigation. The first situation when this 
would be so involves cement. At present, 3.8% of global carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions 
come from cement.19 Much of this is generated by those economies which are becoming 
affluent quickly; for example, China is reliant on cement. If there were to be new 
technologies which allow for the production of cement with minimal emissions of CO2 and 
other associated pollutants such as mercury, and such technology was patented, this may 
enable private control of steps which could be taken to mitigate climate change.20 Secondly, a 
patent owner may obtain or purchase patents for important technologies across the renewable 
sector- for example, wave, wind and biogas. Each patent may not confer power, but the 
combined suite may do so—producing what could be termed an essential patent owner. It is 
not clear, however, if this is a significant practical concern, given the differences between 
these different industry sectors. Thirdly, a patent may involve an element of infrastructure 
upon which several sectors of renewable energy may depend.  
 
Finally, an entirely new form of generating power may be developed which is so clean and 
economical that alternative sources of energy (including conventional energy sources), are 
too inefficient and cannot compete. This could provide a different, and much more effective 
                                                
17 The McKinsey Curve suggests that insulation has the potential to abate roughly 4 giga-tonnes of CO2 per year 
which would cost around !9 per tonne; new forms of energy generation such as solar could abate 30 giga-tonnes 
of CO2 per year, but it would cost !20 per tonne. 
18 Dietz, T. ‘Narrowing the US Efficiency Gap’ PNAS September 14, 2010 vol. 107 no. 37 16007-16008 
19 See the International Energy Agency’s 2007 Report ‘Tracking Industrial Energy Efficiency and Co2 
Emissions,’ available at http://www.iea.org/Textbase/npsum/tracking2007SUM.pdf.  
20 Regarding ongoing work in this area, see Cement Sustainability Initiative ‘New Cement Industry Figures on 
CO2 and Energy Performance Show Reduction in Emissions Intensity’ (July 2010) 
http://www.wbcsd.org/Plugins/DocSearch/details.asp?DocTypeId=251&ObjectId=Mzg1MzM&URLBack=/tem
plates/TemplateWBCSD2/layout.asp%3Ftype%3Dp%26MenuId%3DMzcx%26doOpen%3D1%26ClickMenu%
3DRightMenu and http://wbcsdcement.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=57&Itemid=118. It 
is noteworthy, however, that some new technologies for sequestering/storing captured CO2 from coal power 
plants into cement bricks have raised their own concerns over the overall environmental benefit, due to 
embedded heavy metals in building materials, see e.g. http://ipsd.typepad.com/ipsd/2010/07/energy-ministers-
endorse-clean-tech-measures-back-ccs-group.html. 
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means, of mitigating climate change. The prospects of this may seem unlikely, and one 
example, Cold Fusion, has long been the subject of sceptical discussion.21 Yet it should be 
borne in mind that one prominent theory of innovation teaches that even if an innovation may 
appear unlikely to the incumbents in a field, there is always the prospect of an unexpected 
and radical innovation, which sweeps away established approaches.22  
 
The prospects of essential technologies existing may be more likely in relation to adaptation 
and information. If climate change does, as suggested by the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change lead to an increased incidence of vector-borne disease (such as malaria) or to 
the decimation of crops, 23 then new vaccines or plant varieties may be required. In terms of 
information provision, software for assessing and forecasting climate change impacts, or for 
measuring, reporting and verifying emission reductions may be important. Also important 
may be access to geospatial data and monitoring information.24 Legislation does exist in the 
European Union to ensure that there can be wide access to some of this information, through 
the Directive On Public Access to Environmental Information and also the Directive on the 
re-use of Public Sector Information.25 These instruments apply only to public authorities. The 
term ‘public authorities’ does include, in this context, private entities having public functions 
                                                
21For overview of the fate of Cold Fusion, see discussion in Nature 
http://www.nature.com/news/2007/070329/full/news070326-12.html. and 
http://blogs.nature.com/news/blog/2010/03/acs_cold_fusion_calorimeter.html; and LENR-CANR.org 
http://lenr-canr.org/. 
22 Schumpeter, A. (1943) ‘Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy’ George, Allen & Unwin Ltd, London, UK, 
84, Geroski, P.A. ‘Intellectual Property Rights, Competition Policy and Innovation: Is There a Problem?’, 
(2005) 2:4 SCRIPT-ed 422 @: http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/vol2-4/geroski.asp, 427 
23 See IPCC Working Group II Assessment Report 4 ‘Climate Change: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability’ 
(2007) 
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_ipcc_fourth_assessment_report_wg2_report_impacts_a
daptation_and_vulnerability.htm, esp chapter 8 ‘Human Health’. For discussion of food more generally, see 
Haugen, H.M. (2007) The Right to Food and the TRIPs Agreement with a Particular Emphasis on Development 
Countries Measures for Food Protection and Distribution, Brill, Netherlands 
24See eg Infoterra http://www.infoterra-global.com/ as an example of a company involved in this area. From the 
IP perspective, there has been increasing scholarly discussion regarding in information control : see Waelde, C. 
‘Databases and lawful users: the chink in the armour’ I.P.Q. 2006, 3, 256-282; Saxby, S. ‘Public policy and the 
digital geospatial representation of designated land use in the UK: Part 1’ and ‘Public policy and the digital 
geospatial representation of designated land use in the UK: Part 2’ J. Env. L. 2007, 19(1), 5-28 and J. Env. L. 
2007, 19(2), 227-246; and Derclaye, E. ‘Intellectual property rights and global warming‘ [2008] 12 Marquette 
Intellectual Property Law Review, 263 
25Directive 2003/4/EC, implemented in the UK by The Environmental Information Regulations 2004 (SI 2004 
No. 3391) and Directive 2003/98/EC, implemented in the UK in the Re-use of Public Sector Information 
Regulations 2005 (SI 2005 1515). See discussion in Derclaye, E. ‘Does the Directive on the Re-use of Public 
Sector Information affect the State’s database sui generis right?‘, in Gaster, J, Schweighofer, E and Sint, P. 
(eds.), Knowledge rights—legal, societal and related technological aspects. Austrian Computer Society, (2008)  
 7  
or responsibilities;26 it is highly unlikely, however, to cover the types of private entities which 
are more likely to be IP owners.27  
 
Thus as with other technologies, the owner of a software patent may be in a position of 
significant power if it could be established that an invention is particularly important for 
addressing climate change and no feasible substitutes are available. Owners of copyright and 
database rights could also be in a position of significant power in respect of the dissemination 
of particular data sets—and in some jurisdictions, the data sets themselves could be the 
subject of IP.  
 
For such technologies, additional issues arise. For example, if standards are developed in 
relation to a particular technology, this would mean that businesses and customers would be 
either obliged, or feel obliged, to use the same or similar technology. Standards can be 
developed either formally, for example through the International Telecommunications 
Union,28 or more informally through industry and consumer adoption of de facto standards. 
This has been seen in the communications industry in relation to Microsoft and Rambus 
which has led to cases considered below.29 In order to address these matters, many 
organizations have patent policies which require disclosure of patents prior to consideration 
and adoption of the standard by the relevant body.30 
 
Thus in the case of an entirely new and radical innovation, a means of addressing existing 
significant outputs such as cement, some adaptation technologies and information 
monitoring, it can be argued that technologies could be essential to prevent and respond to 
climate change. If they are also the subject of IP, then a number of questions arise. On the 
one hand, some argue that the IP owner and investors in the technology should be rewarded 
for their innovation and creativity;31 and that imposing limits or exceptions on IP may 
                                                
26 The Carbon Trust which was found not to be a public authority and as such not open to consideration for 
disclosure—see decision of Information Commissioner 
www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/decisionnotices/2009/fs_50154684.pdf.  
27 See HM Stationery Office v Green Amps Ltd [2007] EWHC 2755, discussed in Derclaye, E. ‘Of maps, Crown 
copyright, research and the environment’ E.I.P.R. 2008, 30(4), 162-164 
28 See details of activity in relation to climate change at http://www.itu.int/themes/climate/ and in relation to 
standardization at http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/ 
29 See p34 et seq 
30 See, eg. the ‘common patent policy’ of the ISO, ITU and IEC from 2006 
http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink/fetch/2000/2122/3770791/customview.html?func=ll&objId=3770791&objA
ction=browse. 
31 This is a wide and deep debate. See eg Mackaay, E. (1990 ‘Economic Incentives in Markets for Information 
and Innovation’, Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy’, 13(3), Summer, 867-909 and Merges, R.P. 
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preclude such important technologies, and their contribution to combating climate change, 
from being developed in the first instance. On the other hand, one may argue that limits 
should be imposed on the power of the IP owner to encourage the dissemination of these 
essential technologies. These perspectives will now be explored.  
 
Limiting or enhancing the power of IP  
 
The international framework 
 
The relationship between private IP rights and public bodies and interests is, as noted, a topic 
of considerable debate. Some identify a clash between private IP rights and public interests, 
while others consider the two to be mutually supportive. This range of views is also reflected 
at the international level. States may have ratified, and have obligations under, the Kyoto 
Protocol to the UNFCCC in relation to the reduction of their greenhouse gas emissions.32 
These states may also, like the United Kingdom, be members of the World Trade 
Organization (‘WTO’).33 One of the annexes to the Agreement establishing the WTO is 
TRIPS—the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.34  
 
TRIPS sets out minimum requirements in relation to the level of protection to be provided to 
IP.35 TRIPS also permits (but does not require) states to introduce some exceptions to the 
rights, and also to have compulsory licensing (that is, the use of an invention without the 
authorization of the patent owner), provided requirements are met.36 There are also articles 7 
and 8 TRIPS, which articulate that not only should IP contribute to the promotion of 
technological innovation as well as the transfer and dissemination of technology, but also that 
                                                                                                                                                  
(1994), ‘Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property’, Columbia Law Review, 94, 2655-73 both in 
Towse, R. and Holzhammer, (eds) (2002) The Economics of Intellectual Property: vol I Introduction and 
Copyright The International Library of Critical Writing in Economics 145, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 
Cheltenham, UK at 8 and 95 respectively and Scherer, F.M. ‘The Innovation Lottery’ 3 in Dreyfuss, R.C. et al 
(eds) (2001) Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual Property. Innovation Policy for the Knowledge Society 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK and New York, USA.  
32http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php, see in particular articles 2 and 3. For details of ratification, 
see http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php.  
33http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm#wtoagreement. See list of member states at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm  
34 The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex 1C: see 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm.  
35 Regarding patents, see article 27, regarding copyright see article 9 
36 Regarding patents, see article 30 and 31 and regarding copyright see article 9. For some history of compulsory 
licences, see Wadlow, C. ‘The great pharmaceutical patent robbery, and the curious case of the Chemical 
Foundation’ I.P.Q. 2010, 3, 256-292  
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members may adopt measures necessary to promote the public interest in areas of 
fundamental importance to their socio-economic and technological development—where 
such measures are consistent with the obligations provided for in TRIPS. Further, article 6 
TRIPS states that TRIPS shall not address exhaustion of rights. This leaves it open to states to 
choose the approach they wish to take to goods which are the subject of IP being imported 
from another country where the IP-protected good has already been subject to a ‘first sale’ 
authorized by the right holder.37 Finally, article 66(2) TRIPS mandates that developed 
country members shall implement policies to promote and encourage the transfer of 
technologies to least developed country members, although the implementation and effect of 
this provision has been questioned.38 Conversely, article 1 (1) TRIPS provides that states may 
implement more extensive protection than is required, provided that such protection does not 
contravene the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement.  
 
Against this backdrop, a state concerned about the relationship of IP and climate change may 
consider that it wishes to impose limits on IP to pursue its obligations under the UNFCCC or, 
if it is a member, under the Kyoto Protocol (or any regime which might follow the Kyoto 
Protocol, after the expiry of its first commitment period at the end of 2012). Conversely, a 
state may take a different approach and want to provide higher levels of IP protection, to 
encourage domestic innovation in relation to climate change.  
 
The state seeking to impose limits on IP may consider that this is consistent with articles 7 
and 8 TRIPS, the provisions regarding exceptions and compulsory licensing ( articles 27(2), 
30 and 31) and the silence of TRIPS regarding the importing of goods the subject of IP from 
another country.39 Yet the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (another annex to the 
WTO Agreement)40 enables states to complain about the conduct of other states.41 A 
                                                
37For a brief introduction to this, see Cottier, T. ‘The exhaustion of intellectual property rights—a fresh look’ 
IIC 2008, 39(7) 755-757  
38Moon, S. ‘Does TRIPS Article 66.2 encourage Tech Transfer to LDCs?’ (2008) 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iprs_pb20092_en.pdf  
39 See arguments in Gervais, D.’Intellectual Property and Human Rights: learning to live together’ 3 in 
Torremans, P. (ed) (2008) Intellectual Property and Human rights Wolters Kluwer and Yu, PK. ‘The Objectives 
and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement’ Houston Law Review [2009] 46(4) 979  
40 Dispute Settlement Understanding ( Annex 2 to the WTO Agreement) 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/28-dsu_e.htm. For resources regarding dispute resolution, see 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm.  
41 See eg Canada — Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products DS 114 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds114_e.htm. Canada was challenged when it sought to 
facilitate quicker access to products in its pharmaceutical industry by passing legislation enabling generic 
manufactures (that is, those other than the patent owner) to take steps towards obtaining regulatory clearance 
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developed country such as the United States, for example, may complain about the new 
legislation,42 possibly at the behest of the many IP based businesses which are based in that 
country.43 If there is a finding that a state has acted inconsistently with its obligations under 
TRIPS, then trade sanctions may be imposed.44 It should also be borne in mind that if a 
country has acted inconsistently with non-IP related obligations, the aggrieved Member State 
may waive the IP it would otherwise be obliged to offer to the other member states.45 This 
differs from the arrangements available under the UNFCCC46 and the compliance procedures 
which were set up in relation to the Kyoto Protocol.47  
 
Accordingly, states who wish to limit IP in a manner which goes beyond the existing 
flexibilities in TRIPS, or if states are concerned that other states might consider their 
measures to go beyond TRIPS, might wish to encourage, or take, action at the international 
level. One route could be seeking a new international declaration addressing access to 
essential technologies in relation to climate change; and another route could be arguing that if 
a complaint should be made about their national legislation, then the WTO bodies should 
look, in addition to TRIPS as a whole, to other fields of law when determining if there was 
indeed conduct which was inconsistent with TRIPS.  
 
                                                                                                                                                  
and manufacturing products before patents had expired. The panel found that part of the Canadian initiative (that 
relating to regulatory clearance) was consistent with Canada’s obligations under TRIPS, but that the rest was 
not.  
42 For details of environment related WTO disputes, see 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/edis00_e.htm. For discussion of climate change and WTO more 
generally, see Cottier et al (eds) (2009) International Trade Regulation and the Mitigation of Climate Change 
World Trade Forum Cambridge University Press, UK  
43 See Shaffer, G.C. (2003) ‘Defending Interests: Public-Private Partnerships in WTO Litigation’ Brookings 
Institution Press, Washington, USA  
44 See eg Warren F. Schwartz and Alan O. Sykes (2002) ‘The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute 
Resolution in the World Trade Organization’ Journal of Legal Studies, XXXI (1, Part 2), January, S179-S204, 
52 and Steve Charnovitz (2001) ‘Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions’ American Journal of International Law, 
95(4), October, 792-832, 247 ) both in Mavroidis, P.C. and Sykes, A.O. (eds) (2005) The WTO and 
International Trade Law/Dispute Settlement Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA.  
45 For example, see the dispute between the United States and Brazil over US cotton subsidies, WT/DS 267 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds267_e.htm. An August 2009 WTO arbitration report 
gave Brazil the right to use trade countermeasures against the US, and in specific circumstances to suspend 
intellectual property rights obligations—see discussion in IP Watch, WTO/TRIPS, 7 September 2009. See also 
see Grosse Ruse-Kahn, H. ‘A pirate of the Caribbean? The attractions of suspending TRIPS obligations’ J.I.E.L. 
2008, 11(2), 313-364 
46 See article 14 UNFCCC regarding settlement of disputes  
47 See article 18 Kyoto Protocol, Decision 27/CMP 1 
http://unfccc.int/documentation/decisions/items/3597.php?such=j&volltext=27/CMP.1#beg and details of 
activities at . See discussion in Oberthür, S.and Lefeber, R. ‘Holding countries to account: The Kyoto Protocol’s 
compliance system revisited after four years of experience’ (2010) 1 Climate Law 133-158 and Doelle, M. 
‘Early Experience with the Kyoto Compliance System: Possible Lessons for MEA Compliance System Design’ 
(2010) http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1628083. 
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The Declaration(s) route  
 
As a matter of principle… 
 
The likelihood of a declaration being made would form part of complex web of international 
politics in relation to IP.48 Firstly, a declaration could be sought from an international 
institution which could require, or permit, that states take steps regarding the sharing of 
essential technologies. A declaration could be sought in the WTO, the UNFCCC (which 
might seem most appropriate for a declaration in relation to climate change), or the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (‘WIPO’), the UN body responsible for administering 
international IP treaties.49  
 
A model for this could be the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, passed 
by the WTO at Doha (‘The Doha Declaration’).50 This declaration states that it is consistent 
with article 31 TRIPS51 for states to pass legislation which limits the power of IP owners in 
relation to national health emergencies, provided that the legislation meets the requirements 
set forth in article 31. The legal status of declarations is, however, unclear.52 It is also 
debatable whether or not the Doha Declaration did have an impact on the attitude of IP 
owners, and of states, to the licensing of IP to deal with national health emergencies.53 
Further, the Doha Declaration was made in an entirely different context, motivated by the 
threat of the spread of the AIDS epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa. The need for climate 
                                                
48 For discussion of the politics and power in relation to IP, see Sell. S.K. ‘Cat and Mouse: Industries’, States’ 
and NGOs’ Forum—Shifting in the Battle Over Intellectual Property Enforcement’ (September 1, 2009) 
available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1466156; Dinwoodie, G. D. ‘The international intellectual property 
law system: new actors, new institutions, new sources’ (2006) 10:2 Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review 
205-214; and Yu, P.K. ‘Currents and crosscurrents in the International Intellectual Property Regime’ (2004) 
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Vol 38  
49 For website, see http://www.wipo.int/portal/index.html.en. 
50 World Trade Organization ‘Declaration on the TRIPS agreement and public health’ DOHA WTO 
MINISTERIAL 2001: TRIPS. Adopted on 14 November 2001. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 20 November 2001 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm.  
51 See p11 
52 Charnovitz, S. ‘The legal status of the Doha Declarations.’ J.I.E.L. 2002, 5(1), 207-211; Gathii, J.T. ‘The 
Doha Declaration on Trips and Public Health Under the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties’ Harvard 
Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2002, 292; Shanker, D. ‘The Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, the Dispute Settlement System of the WTO and the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement’ 
J.W.T. 2002 36(4) 721-772; and Hestermeyer, H. (2007) Human Rights and the WTO. The Case of Patents and 
Access to Medicines Oxford University Press, New York, USA 122 et seq, 129, 255-87  
53 Brazil did issue a compulsory licence for a patented AIDS drug after failing to reach an agreement with the 
patent holder with regards to lowering prices—see http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/6490/ cf Abbott, F. and 
Reichman, J. ‘The Doha Round’s public health legacy: strategies for the production and diffusion of patented 
medicines under the amended TRIPS provisions.’ J.I.E.L. 2007, 10(4), 921-987 and Kuanpoth, J. ‘Patents and 
access to medicines in Thailand—the ddI case and beyond.’ I.P.Q. 2006, 2, 149-158 
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mitigation, adaptation and information technologies can be argued to be distinct from the 
urgent need for medicines to address an unanticipated epidemic rapidly advancing through a 
population. Some may consider the two issues to be linked, however, if it could be 
established that a particular spread of disease occurred as a result of climate change, rather 
than being one which would have been expected in any event. Yet there is a great risk that 
such a declaration in the climate context could, in a counterproductive manner, delay 
implementation of more pragmatic, and less contentious, solutions, such as encouraging the 
further development of climate-related technologies. 
 
More practically, if a declaration were to be pursued, in spite of these risks, what might it 
say? 
 
The technology and information 
 
How might the term ‘essential technology’ be described in a clear and transparent manner, 
consistent with good governance which has sought for the UNFCCC and other international 
institutions implicated by climate change?54 A declaration could refer to the introduction by 
states of legislation regarding the provision of access to those technologies that have been 
established to be able to have a significant impact on greenhouse gas emissions, their 
evaluation and impact. For mitigation, this could cover the cold fusion-esque and cement type 
examples; from the adaptation perspective, it might include technologies for responding to an 
increased incidence of malaria; it could cover information which is important to assess macro 
and micro climate change developments. There may be arguments, however, as to what the 
appropriate levels of impact are and how this could be assessed properly. Consider, for 
example, the discussion in 2010 about the accuracy of the 2007 report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 55 and indeed the fact that relevant data may, as 
noted, be under private control.  
                                                
54 See eg EGTT Report for Copenhagen 11 November 2009 FCCC/SB/2009/4/Summary 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/sb/eng/04sum.pdf, referring to linkages with other UNFCCC bodies, para 
3(b) and to its design process, para 5; UNESCAP, ‘What Is Good Governance’ (UNESCAP, 2009), available at 
http://www.unescap.org/pdd/prs/ProjectActivities/Ongoing/gg/governance.asp; and more generally Esty, D.C 
‘Good governance at the World Trade Organization: building a foundation of administrative law’ J.I.E.L. 2007, 
10(3), 509-527 
55 IPCC 4th Assessment Report 2007 http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_and_data.htm cf: 
‘Assessing an IPCC Assessment: An Analysis of Statements on Projected Regional Impacts in the 2007 Reports’ 
[2010] The Hague/Bilthoven located at http://www.pbl.nl/en/publications/2010/Assessing-an-IPCC-
assessment.-An-analysis-of-statements-on-projected-regional-impacts-in-the-2007-report.html; and 
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A more straightforward approach, as a legal matter, may be for the declaration to refer to a 
national emergency, following the existing article 31(b) TRIPS and the approach taken by the 
Doha Declaration. One could argue, however, that this is merely storing up problems for a 
later date. As was noted above in relation to the Doha Declaration, there have been arguments 
that some countries are imposing compulsory licensing in situations which other countries do 
not consider to be a national emergency.56 As also noted above, it is not clear whether or not 
the ability to access one component of ‘greenhouse-gas related technology’ (which may or 
may not be established to be required to respond to the emergency in question) would be 
viewed in the same light as the need to obtain particular medicines in the face of an 
advancing, infectious epidemic such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis or malaria57 as noted in the 
Doha Declaration. 58 Further, the notion that patents are a barrier to access in the public health 
area is still a subject of great controversy. Given arguments in the context of climate change 
that a multiplicity of new technologies are needed over a sustained period of time, and the 
complex web of the politics and IP, there would appear to be even less likelihood of 
acceptance that individual patents pose obstacles to a national emergency.  
 
Access on what terms 
 
Yet if there is to be a declaration, and essential technology can be identified, what about 
matters of detail? Would licensing arrangements apply only to local manufacturers who wish 
to manufacture technology following the patent, or would it also cover those who wish to 
import from elsewhere—or indeed who must do, as they are unable to manufacture 
themselves?59 And in terms of finances and reward, would the focus of any declaration be to 
                                                                                                                                                  
Interacademy Council (30 August 2010) ‘Review of the Process and Procedures of the IPCC’ 
http://reviewipcc.interacademycouncil.net/report/Climate%20Change%20Assessments,%20Review%20of%20t
he%20Processes%20&%20Procedures%20of%20the%20IPCC.pdf. 
56 See p13 and Doha Declaration, article 5(c).  
57 Subject to the points made above regarding adaptation 
58 See comparison of the validity of a comparison between health and climate change in Abbott. F.M. (2009) 
‘Innovation and Technology Transfer to Address Climate Change Lessons from the Global Debate on 
Intellectual Property and Public Health’ http://ictsd.org/i/publications/50454.  
59 The Doha Declaration was noted to be of little help for those states with limited manufacturing capacity; and 
in 2003 there was a Decision at Cancun which looked beyond the present scope of TRIPS. This permitted (but 
did not require) the states to permit manufacture of drugs for export to and import by countries where there was 
a public health emergency, and where complex preliminary procedures were observed. See World Trade 
Organization ‘Implementation of paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS agreement and public 
health’ Decision of the General Council on 30 August 2003 WT/:/540 and Corr.1 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm and Chairperson’s statement 13 November 
2003 WT/GC/M/82 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/gc_stat_30aug03_e.htm and World Trade 
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ensure that there can be no private control of relevant information or technology, with all 
those who to wish to use it able to do so for payment? Or is it indeed to ensure that the 
information and technology is open to all for no charge?  
 
The first option, from the viewpoint of IP owners and investors, would at least leave open the 
potential for some form of reward.60 This would be consistent with TRIPS article 31(h), 
which states in relation to compulsory licences that ‘the right holder shall be paid adequate 
remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking into account the economic value of 
the authorization’. That payment is still likely, however, to be less than that which IP owners 
may wish to charge others61 or what could be argued by those supporting IP as being required 
to justify investment in the research and development needed to stimulate the creation of the 
product. It would also still undermine the central right of the patents system—the right to 
exclude—and may hinder, rather than enhance, the development and dissemination of 
climate-related technologies. This is likely in turn to lead to IP owners resisting the 
imposition of limits on what can be done on the basis of IP. 
 
In terms of the level of direction imposed by any declaration, should it require that countries 
have legislation which mandates IP owners to share the technologies in question on particular 
terms—a model which would be the inverse of TRIPS, and strongly resisted? Would it 
require that countries have legislation which permits IP owners to share the technologies in 
question on particular terms? Or would it provide that states may have legislation which 
permits IP owners to share the technologies in question on particular terms—a format closer 
to TRIPS and the Doha Declaration? Once again, the final option may raise the least 
objection from IP owners, but it may not be favoured by other interests.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
Organization Ministerial statement adopted 14 September 2003 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/min03_14sept_e.htm. For details of the use made of 
this, see ‘TRIPS and public health: dedicated webpage for notifications’ 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/public_health_e.htm. A formal amendment to TRIPS in these 
respects has been agreed, with a deadline for acceptance of 2011. World Trade Organization Decision of the 
General Council 6 December 2005 ‘Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement’ WT/L/641 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/wtl641_e.htm and Chairperson’s statement 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news05_e/trips_319_e.htm. The deadline for acceptance has been extended 
to December 2011—for status update, see http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_E/trips_e/amendment_e.htm.  
60Se p9  
61 See discussion in Taubman, A. ‘Rethinking TRIPS: ‘adequate remuneration’ for non-voluntary patent 
licensing’ J.I.E.L. 2008, 11(4), 927-970 
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Finally, reverting to the question of fora, where could any declaration be made—and there is 
the accompanying question, of which body should make the decision as to whether or not a 
technology is essential.  
 
Forum 
 
At the WTO, the Doha Declaration came after difficult political negotiations—even after, as 
has been noted, a backdrop of strong international concern at the use of patent based 
arguments to prevent access to essential medicines, for example in relation to legislation 
passed in South Africa.62 As noted above, there is scope for some arguments to be made in 
relation to the existence of essential technologies regarding adaptation and information 
technologies and possibly also in relation to new mitigation technologies. These arguments 
must be acknowledged, however, to be less forceful than those in relation to pharmaceutical 
drugs, with the possible exception, once again, of diseases, eg tropical diseases such as 
malaria, whose spread may be directly linked to climate change. Another declaration in the 
WTO may not be feasible.  
 
At WIPO, there have been significant changes in approach and outlook within WIPO, leading 
to the establishment of the WIPO Development Agenda.63 There have been attempts to 
discuss climate change issues in relation to IP, for example at the discussions of WIPO Patent 
Standing Committee,64 but there has not been swift progress. This again suggests that a 
declaration may not be feasible.  
                                                
62Medicines and Related Substances Control Act 1965 as amended by the Medicines and the Related Substances 
Control Amendment Act 1997. See also Murakyembe, H. and Kanja, G.M. ‘Implications of the TRIPS 
Agreement on the Access to Cheaper Pharma Drugs by Developing Countries: Case Study of South Africa v 
The Pharmaceutical Companies’ Zambia Law Journal vol 34, 2002, 111 and Cameron, E. and Berger, J. ‘Patents 
and Public Health: Principle, Politics and Paradox’ Inaugural British Academy Law Lecture 
http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/docs/cameron.asp. 
63 Geneva Declaration on the Future of the World Intellectual Property Organization 
http://www.cptech.org/ip/wipo/futureofwipodeclaration.html and ‘The 45 Adopted Recommendations under the 
WIPO Development Agenda’ http://www.wipo.int/ip-development/en/agenda/recommendations.html and see 
generally http://www.wipo.int/ip-development/en/agenda/. See also Deere-Birkbeck, C. and Marchant, R. ‘The 
Technical Assistance Principles of the WIPO Development Agenda and their Practical Implementation’ ICTSD 
Issue Paper No. 28 March 2010 http://ictsd.org/downloads/2010/04/deere_marchant_new2.pdf. 
64 See report of 13th Meeting at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/scp_13/scp_13_7.pdf. and 14th 
meeting at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/scp_14/scp_14_9_rev.pdf and report from Knowledge 
Ecology International http://keionline.org/node/776. The 15th meeting was held in mid October 2010 
http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/details.jsp?meeting_id=19684 (see item 20 on non exhaustive list of issues 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/scp_15/scp_15_inf_2.doc and the inclusion of climate change in the 
list of issues for in the Chair’s Summary of 15 October 2010 (see annex) although not in the list of future work 
(see para 12) http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/scp_15/scp_15_5.doc. 
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Discussions within the UNFCCC have also not proceeded swiftly, as can be seen from the 
Copenhagen Climate Change Conference discussions in December 2009.65 Prior to 
Copenhagen there were discussions in the policy and academic sphere about introducing 
some form of compulsory licensing of IP to facilitate the transfer of climate change related 
technologies—albeit without deep discussion as to why and how this might be required.66 
There were strong objections to this within some67 of the IP owning community in the United 
States, culminating in a letter written to President Obama arguing that there should be no 
declaration.68 In the light of these divergent views, work on IP does still proceed.69  
 
Given the slow movement of the international climate change meetings, it might seem 
counterproductive for a declaration relating to IP to be sought within the UNFCCC—given 
that there is at least some focus on IP within WIPO and the WTO. Yet one may ask whether 
it is preferable for the discussions about IP to continue now in the UNFCCC even if this 
might mean that progress at the UNFCCC regarding climate change is delayed for a time? 
One’s attitude to this will depend on a number of factors. If the prospects of a new 
groundbreaking technology, a significant impact on existing emissions, information control 
or addressing the impacts of climate change on health and food provision are not perceived to 
be likely or of importance, then focus on this in the UNFCCC is unlikely. However, some 
would argue that deeper discussion of IP at the UNFCCC would be worthwhile if there is 
concern at what might arise from the private ownership of technology.  
 
                                                
65 For meeting reports, see http://unfccc.int/meetings/cop_15/conference_programme/items/5071.php. 
66 See footnote 9 and Abbott. F.M. (2009) ‘Innovation and Technology Transfer to Address Climate Change 
Lessons from the Global Debate on Intellectual Property and Public Health’ 
http://ictsd.org/i/publications/50454/. See also Copenhagen Economics (2009) ‘Are IPR a Barrier to the Transfer 
of Climate Change Technology’ http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/february/tradoc_142371.pdf cf Lee, 
B. et al (2009) ‘Who Owns Our Low Carbon Future? Intellectual Property and Energy Technologies’ Chatham 
House www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/14699_r0909_lowcarbonfuture.pdf. 
67 Apple and Nike parted ways with the US Chamber of Commerce over differences of opinion on climate 
policies.  
http://ipsd.typepad.com/ipsd/2009/10/dissent-in-the-ranks-apple-joins-pge-nike-and-others-in-parting-ways-
with-us-chamber.html. 
68 See letter from US senators to the President of the United States sent 2 November 2009, which has been 
accessed via http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/110209obamasenateletter1.pdf . 
This refers repeatedly to weakening IP. 
69 Eg IP is, along with many other items, on the agenda of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term 
Cooperative Action under the Convention, Tenth Session, Bonn 11 June 2010, FCCC/AWGLCA/2010/6 see 
https://unfccc.int/documentation/documents/advanced_search/items/3594.php?rec=j&priref=600005797.  
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In addition, views regarding which UN agency is most suitable to handle IP discussions will 
have an impact. UNFCCC is concerned with stabilizing greenhouse gases and preventing 
dangerous impacts of climate change.70 WIPO is a ‘specialized agency of the UN’ dedicated 
to IP and is generally acknowledged as the UN agency with the most expertise in that topic.71 
This suggests that if the aim is to address IP, the discussions and any declaration should be 
pursued in the UN forum most suited to topic—WIPO. This argument does not, however, 
address the complex question of the relationship between the WTO and WIPO in relation to 
IP,72 and the fact that a non UN body, the WTO, arguably is the main international body now 
in relation to IP.73  
 
In summary, there is the potential (albeit slim), for a declaration to be made. It could be made 
at the WTO, WIPO or the UNFCCC. Consistent with our aim of a holistic approach, a 
declaration could be pursued in parallel, in each of the three bodies. This would be a novel 
approach; but if there were such declarations, this would send a strong statement as to the 
balance of interests between private and public, reward and openness, which the international 
community considered appropriate. It would also remove some of the opportunities for forum 
shopping and regime shifting which may arise if, say, a declaration is made only at WIPO, 
which could be argued to be irrelevant if dispute should arise in relation to, say, the Kyoto 
Protocol or TRIPS.  
 
Scope for a wide approach to existing international obligations 
 
Given the points made above regarding international dispute settlement, the system of most 
interest is that of TRIPS. Regarding the impact of declarations made outside the WTO, the 
key issue is the stance which is taken by the WTO dispute settlement bodies to fields other 
than trade law (specifically, here, IP), such as the Kyoto Protocol and human rights. This 
could arise if a state has legislation which seeks to limit the power of patent owners and the 
WTO body must determine whether or not a state has acted consistently with its obligations 
                                                
70 See UNFCC, Article 2. 
71 See ‘About WIPO,’ available at http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/what_is_wipo.html. 
72 A fascinating starting point in this field in Drahos, P. with Braithwaite, J. (2002) Information Feudalism : who 
owns the knowledge economy, Earthscan  
73 Although note that discussions also continue in relation to IP in fora quite outside the WIPO and WTO. For 
details of the ongoing secret negotiations, in 2010 of the proposed new agreement outside, Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement, see the resources at http://www.laquadrature.net/en/ACTA. The politics of IP (see footnote 
48) continue to run deep.  
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under TRIPS or has moved beyond the flexibilities available in articles 27(2) 30 and 31 
TRIPS discussed above. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969,74 
which determines how these provisions might be interpreted, is highly relevant to this 
discussion.75  
 
The more traditional view is that fields other than trade law are not relevant.76 For those who 
move beyond that, there is also disagreement between scholars as to whether regard could be 
had to other instruments in interpreting TRIPS where the parties to TRIPS and the other 
instruments (say, the Kyoto Protocol) are not the same.77 The point has been raised at the 
WTO. In the Shrimp Turtle case, the WTO decision makers had regard to the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, even though not all parties 
to the dispute were members of it.78 This has been much criticised as inconsistent with the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.79 In the Biotech case,80 it was argued that the 
Panel could look to the Cartagena Protocol when considering the ‘ordinary meaning’ of WTO 
provisions.81 The Panel considered that it could look to this as informative of widely 
                                                
74 UNTS vol 1155, p331 
75 See article 3.2 Dispute Settlement Understanding and United States — Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline DS2 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds2_e.htm, see also 
discussion of the Vienna Convention in eg Korea — Measures Affecting Government Procurement DS 163 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds163_e.htm. Article 31(1) Vienna Convention states that 
treaty provisions are to be interpreted in good faith, in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty, in their context and in light of their object and purpose; Article 31(2) provides that the 
context will include agreements made between the parties in relation to the treaty; Article 31 (3) states that 
account shall also be taken of agreements between the parties regarding its interpretation and sub-section (c) 
provides that any relevant rules of international law which are applicable in the relations between the parties 
should be taken into account when interpreting a treaty. 
76 For discussion of this and the extent to which decision makers could or should look more widely, see Howse, 
R. ‘The Most Dangerous Branch? WTO Appellate Body Jurisprudence on the Nature and Limits of the Judicial 
Power’ 11 in Cottier, T and Mavroidis, P.C.(eds) (2003) The Role of the Judge in International Trade 
Regulation. Experience and Lessons for the WTO University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, USA 
77 See McLachlan, C. ‘The principle of systemic integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention’ 
I.C.L.Q. 2005, 54(2), 279-319 and French, D. ‘Treaty interpretation and the incorporation of extraneous legal 
rules’ I.C.L.Q. 2006, 55(2), 281-314  
78 United States — Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products DS 58 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds58_e.htm. 
79 See eg Kulovesi, K.’A link between interpretation, international environmental law and legitimacy at the 
WTO dispute settlement?’ Int. T.L.R. 2005, 11(6), 188-196; Francioni, F. ‘WTO Law in context: the integration 
of International norms on human rights and environmental protection in the dispute settlement process.’ 143 and 
Weiss, F. ‘The limits of the WTO: facing non-trade issues’ 155 in Sacerdoti, G. et al (eds) (2006) The WTO at 
Ten: the Contribution of the Dispute Settlement System Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK; Howse, 
R. ‘The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A New Legal Baseline for the Trade and 
Environment Debate’, available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/articles/howseshrimp.pdf published at 2002 27 
Colum. J. Envtl. L.; and Howse at footnote 76.  
80 EC—Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products DS291 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds291_e.htm. 
81 Within Vienna Convention article 31(1)(a). 
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(although not wholly) accepted intentions of nations—but it considered that this was not 
required in that dispute.82  
 
More widely, work from some scholars does argue that human rights and the environment 
should be considered alongside trade law 83 although this has received more attention from 
commentators than from WTO dispute settlement bodies. It may therefore seem less likely 
that a state would be minded to rely on human rights arguments. Nonetheless, a state may 
choose to argue, say in support of legislation requiring that malaria vaccines and drought 
resistant seeds are made more widely available, that the WTO dispute settlement body should 
have regard to rights set out in international human rights treaties.84 Relevant rights85 would 
be to life,86 to health87 and to share in the benefits of scientific progress and its application.88 
Note also the resolution of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights that rights 
to life, health, food, clean drinking water and adequate housing are likely to be implicated by 
the effects of climate change.89 Regional human rights instruments (which may have a place 
before the WTO, depending on the position taken in relation to the parties to the dispute and 
the treaty, as discussed above) also include some provisions which could appear relevant to a 
dispute involving IP and the environment. Article 24 African Charter on Human and People’s 
Rights,90 provides that all people shall have a right to a general satisfactory environment 
                                                
82 See EC—Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products DS291 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds291_e.htm paras 7.92-5 
83 Marceau, G. ‘WTO dispute settlement and human rights.’ E.J.I.L. 2002, 13(4), 753-814; Petersmann, E-U. 
‘Human Rights and International Trade: Defining and connecting the Two Fields’ 29 in Cottier, T., Pauwelyn, J. 
and Burgi Bonamoi, E. (eds) (2005) Human Rights and International Trade Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
UK; and Frankel, S. ‘WTO Application of ‘the Customary Rules of Interpretation of Public International Law’ 
to Intellectual Property’ 46 Va. J. Intl L. 365 2005-6  
84 For membership of international human rights treaties at 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&lang=en. 
85 For discussion of these articles and IP, see Shaver, L. ‘The Right to Science and Culture’ Wisconsin Law 
Review, Vol. 2010, p. 121 and Matthews, D. ‘Intellectual Property, Human Rights and the Right to Health’ in 
Grosheide, W. (ed) 2010 Intellectual Property and Human Rights. A Paradox Edward Elgar, UK. Regarding 
human rights and the environment more generally, see Boyle, A. ‘Human Rights or Environmental Rights? A 
Reassessment’ (2007) Fordham Environmental Law Review Vol XVIII, pp.471-511.  
86 See eg Article 6 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm. 
87 See eg Article 12 Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cescr.htm. 
88 See Article 27 Universal Declaration on Human Rights 1948 http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/, Article 
15 Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966 and Article 15 Universal Declaration on Bioethics 
and Human Rights 2005 http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=31058&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html.  
89 See recital 7 of the Resolution of the Human Rights Council of the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights 25 March 2009 http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/climatechange/docs/resolution10_4.doc.  
90 See http://www.hrcr.org/docs/Banjul/afrhr.html. 
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favourable to their development; article 37 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights,91 which has 
been recognised as having the same legal value than the EU Treaties since the entry into force 
of the Treaty of Lisbon,92 articulates that the European Union must integrate into its policies a 
high level of environmental protection as well as improvement to the quality of the 
environment; and article 11 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union states 
that : ‘Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and 
implementation of the Union’s policies and activities, in particular with a view to promoting 
sustainable development.’  
 
Yet even if a decision maker was minded to look to the human rights discussed above, this 
would not necessarily lead to a decision that legislation regarding wider access to particular 
technology was consistent with WTO obligations. There is also an international human right 
to ‘benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any 
scientific, literary or artistic production’ which a person has authored.93 If the European 
Union is involved, the European Convention of Human Rights, whose rights have been found 
to be fundamental rights of the EU,94 includes a right to property which has been held in the 
Budweiser case to extend to IP;95 and the EU Charter refers to IP, and states that it must 
protected.96  
 
Regarding the international right, a General Comment from the UN Committee on Economic 
Social and Cultural Rights does make it clear that this should be limited to individual 
creators, rather than corporate IP owners, and should also be seen as strongly dependent upon 
                                                
91 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2000/C/264/01 see 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf.  
92 See article 6 (1) Treaty on European Union.  
93 Article 15(1)(c) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1976. See also 
Chapman, A.R ‘Approaching intellectual property as a human right: obligations related to Article 15(1)(c)’ 
Copyright Bulletin, vol XXXV No. 3, July-September 2001 UNESCO Publishing; CIPR p6. 
94 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und Futtermittel (11/70) 
[1970] E.C.R. 1125  
95 There is a right in ECHR Protocol 1, article 1—right to enjoyment of property, which the ECtHR held was a 
right to property Marckx v Belgium (A/31) (1979-80) 2 E.H.R.R. 330, para 63; Anheuser-Busch Inc v Portugal 
(73049/01) [2007] E.T.M.R. 24 (2007) 45 E.H.R.R. 36 confirmed that this right applied to an application for a 
trade mark. For comprehensive analysis of decisions of European human rights bodies in relation to IP, see 
Helfer, L.R. ‘The New Innovation Frontier? Intellectual Property and the European Court of Human Rights’ 
Harvard Journal of International Law Vol 49. No. 1 Winter 2008. 
96 MacCormick, N. ‘Human Rights and Competition Law: Possible Impact of the Proposed EU Constitution’, 
(2005) 2:4 SCRIPTed 444 @: http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/vol2-4/maccormick.asp and Geiger, C. 
‘Intellectual property shall be protected!? Article 17(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union: a mysterious provision with an unclear scope’ E.I.P.R. 2009, 31(3), 113-117.  
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other human rights.97 Nonetheless, this point raises again the question of the positive 
contribution which can be made by IP. There will be those who have, or may develop health 
needs in areas where treatments are not yet available. It could be argued that stronger IP 
incentives may enhance the future delivery of this set of rights.  
 
Accordingly, the human rights contribution to the decision making process is likely to be 
balanced, or in favour of the obligations imposed by TRIPS in relation to patents, rather than 
to support limits on patents. If patented technology could be argued to be essential, then the 
focus shifts to access. This could contribute, then, to a discussion of what is an appropriate 
limit on the rights of a patent owner within TRIPS, in particular to article 31; but it still may 
not prevail.  
 
A different declaration 
 
The review so far has focused on the view of those states that would seek to limit IP. As can 
be seen there are a number of difficult issues that confront these states. To the contrary, there 
may be states that seek exploit the flexibilities of TRIPS to strengthen IP rights, by seeking 
this as the best means of providing incentives for the development and dissemination of 
climate-related technologies. For these states, what is sought is greater clarity and workability 
within the existing IP regime, to deliver a system more favourable to IP owners, in order to 
incentivise the creation and, through licensing, the distribution of what could be essential, 
new technologies. As a result, states may choose to enhance IP, for example through patent 
term extensions, so-called ‘wild card’ patent extensions, substantive patent law 
harmonization, and other means of enhancing legal certainty and new incentives to 
innovate.98  
 
The declaration approach could also be used to try to accomplish these quite different goals. 
A declaration of this nature could recognise the possibility of extending patent terms to 
overcome processing delays that impede the dissemination of particular technologies.99 
However, just as was seen in relation to declarations limiting the power of IP, the political 
                                                
97 General Comment No. 17 (2005) http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/comments.htm. See also 
discussion in Brown, A.E.L. ‘Socially responsible intellectual property: a solution?’ (2005) SCRIPT-ed Vol.2, 
Issue 4, 519-550.  
98 See eg. Maskus, ‘Differentiated Intellectual Property Regimes for Environmental and Climate Technologies, 
OECD Environment Working Papers, No. 17, OECD Publishing (2010). 
99 See p26 regarding new approaches taken by national patent offices  
 22  
feasibility of achieving a declaration of this type is unlikely. In the future, this project will 
further consider the relationship of IP in facilitating the development and distribution of 
climate-related technologies.  
 
Summary 
 
This review suggests so far that only a small range of technologies are likely to be capable of 
being considered essential such that they must be shared, be that for free or for payment. It 
also suggests that the present international regimes which are relevant to this question—
UNFCCC, WIPO, WTO do not provide straightforward means for this to be achieved, either 
through declaration or through dispute resolution. This is particularly so given the wide range 
of views which exist in relation to the topic, notably the positive points which can be made 
about IP and arguably the strong linkage between IP and human rights. Does this mean that a 
focus on access to technologies in the broader context is misconceived?  
 
The importance of technologies  
 
It is submitted that it is not. The Accord resulting from the Copenhagen Climate Change 
Conference in 2009 notes the importance of technology in responding to climate change and 
proposes a new fund and mechanism to assist in technology transfer.100 Technologies, in 
particular groups of established technologies (for example a set of solar panel components), 
may not be essential—but they can be very important. There may be other options which 
could be used rather than these established groups, but there might not be the local capacity 
or resources available for this to be done. This may not warrant interference with IP (indeed, 
older technologies may no longer be the subject of IP), but it does suggest that some activity 
in relation to access to technology, and technology transfer, may be worthwhile. What other 
approaches could be taken? Some options in this respect are now set out.  
  
Better IP more quickly...  
                                                
100 Copenhagen Accord FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/11a01.pdf, paras 10 and 11. See also detailed discussion of IP 
and technology transfer in relation to climate change in Hall, B.H. and Hemers, C. ‘The role of patent protection 
in (clean/green) technology transfer‘ March 2010 Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal 
http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~bhhall/papers/HallHelmers10_SCHTLJ_techtransfer.pdf, and in relation to IP and the 
Copenhagen Accord in Bonadio, Enrico,’ Climate Change and Intellectual Property’ (October 05, 2010). 
European Journal of Risk Regulation, p. 72, March 2010. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1686962. 
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The relationship between IP and innovation is well established, although as noted it is 
challenged by some.101 It is clear that some will not invest in innovation if they cannot obtain 
IP. This is particularly so in respect of venture capitalists, a very important source of funding 
for start up enterprises so that they can commercialise their inventions.102 It can also take 
years before IP can be obtained, and this can mean that businesses and investors are 
proceeding on the basis of IP, and advice in relation to it, even though it is unclear if the IP 
will be granted.103 In the light of this, it is important that, as suggested above in relation to the 
declaration, efforts are made to encourage the quicker and more efficient examination of 
patents and their grant where appropriate. It should also be borne in mind, however, that a 
more slow moving system can allow more time to assess the environmental consequences of 
a particular technology. If patents are to be granted more quickly, then there is a need for IP 
policies which facilitate accelerated assessment of the environmental consequences, such as a 
broader research or experimental-use exemption.104 There is also uncertainty as to what will 
be considered novel and inventive, and this can impose a risk which could deter investors.105 
Greater predictability, always a goal for investors and patent seekers, as to what might 
granted would be important here.  
 
From a practical perspective, some steps are being taken to enhance the contribution of the 
positive elements of IP which were discussed above. The UK Intellectual Property Office 
(‘UK-IPO’) has launched new procedures to enable an application to be considered as 
quickly as possible, and moreover is establishing ‘a new database of green inventions’.106 
                                                
101 See footnotes 15 and 31.  
102 See eg WIPO page ‘Intellectual Property—the Basis for Venture Capital Investments’ 
http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/documents/venture_capital_investments.htm and BVCA Term Sheet Guide, p2,11 
http://admin.bvca.co.uk/library/documents/Term_Sheet.DOC. 
103 See discussion in the UK Gowers Review of Intellectual Property 2008, 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/pbr06_gowers_report_755.pdf, 
sections 3.16-8.  
104 Cf from biotechnology perspective Bor, F. ‘Exemptions to patent infringement applied to biotechnology 
research tools’ E.I.P.R. 2006, 28(1), 5-14 and Cook, T. ‘Responding to concerns about the scope of the defence 
from patent infringement for acts done for experimental purposes relating to the subject matter of the invention’ 
I.P.Q. 2006, 3, 193-222  
105 See discussion in Derclaye, E. ‘Not Only Innovation but also Collaboration, Funding, Goodwill and 
Commitment: Which Role for Patent Laws in Post-Copenhagen Climate Change Action’ 9 J.Marshall Rev. 
Intell. Prop. L. 657 (2010).  
106 See 2009 Press Release of the UK Intellectual Property Office http://www.ipo.gov.uk/about/press/press-
release/press-release-2009/press-release-20090512.htm and from 2010 http://www.ipo.gov.uk/about/press/press-
release/press-release-2010/press-release-20100604.htm. 
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Similar arrangements exist in Canada107 and the United States.108 In 2010, the European 
Patent Office launched a reclassification scheme, with a new symbol for sustainable energy 
technologies.109  
 
....bearing in mind other forms of encouraging innovation 
 
A patent is not necessarily the most appropriate course of action for all innovation; 
collaboration, prizes and trade secrets can all have a role. Yet education in innovation is 
based strongly in IP; it would be of interest to note the impact of new wider education in 
relation to other forms of supporting innovation, for example from the UK perspective by a 
combination of the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs110 and the UK IPO. 
Even for those who seek patents, education could include reminders of initiatives such as Eco 
Patent Commons111 and the Industry Technology Facilitator,112 and from the software field 
Creative Commons,113 as evidence that new forms of sharing innovation can be embraced by 
innovators, creators and business.  
 
Continuing this theme, there could be more state funding of innovation, for example through 
UK’s Technology Strategy Board.114 But there are questions, at least in 2010, as to the 
funding which can be available for state sponsored innovation or indeed, encouraging greater 
investment by banks. Some steps have been taken in relation to climate change, for example 
there is a prize in the UK in relation to carbon capture storage.115 In Scotland, the Saltire 
                                                
107 See Canadian Intellectual Property Office http://www.cipo.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cipointernet-
internetopic.nsf/eng/wr02462.html. 
108 See US Patent and Trademark Office http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2009/09_33.jsp. Note also ongoing 
consultation regarding technologies that address humanitarian needs—see 
http://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2010/09/20/2010-23395/request-for-comments-on-incentivizing-
humanitarian-technologies-and-licensing-through-the. 
109 See discussion from EPO at http://www.epo.org/topics/news/2010/20100727.html. and on Green Patent Blog 
(10 June 2010) http://greenpatentblog.com/2010/06/20/shedding-light-on-green-patents-epo-and-ukipo-launch-
clean-tech-patent-databases/. 
110 http://ww2.defra.gov.uk/. 
111http://www.wbcsd.org/templates/TemplateWBCSD5/layout.asp?ClickMenu=special&type=p&MenuId=MTU
1OQ  
112 http://www.oil-itf.com/. 
113 http://creativecommons.org/  
114 http://www.innovateuk.org/aboutus.ashx. 
115 For Government comment and links, see Department of Energy and Climate Change 
http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/what_we_do/uk_supply/energy_mix/ccs/demo_comp/demo_comp.aspx
. For discussions in March 2010 regarding the prospects of Scottish Power, see 
http://news.scotsman.com/scotland/ScottishPower-to-get-share-of.6126349.jp. 
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Prize launched in 2008116 offers a state funded reward of £10million to the team that 
successfully demonstrates a commercially viable wave or tidal stream energy technology in 
Scottish waters and which produces the greatest volume of electrical output over a set 
minimum. The Saltire Prize does allow, however, entrants to retain ownership of their IP 117 
State funded prizes raise questions of the extent to which the state can properly judge future 
directions of innovation and seek to regulate it;118 and also whether or not it is appropriate for 
there to be private ownership of IP which has resulted from work which has been rewarded 
with a state funded prize. Conversely, there are some privately-funded innovation awards, 
notably !25m Virgin Earth Challenger climate change innovation.119  
 
Another form of protecting innovation (with the Coca-Cola formula being the quintessential 
example), is relying on trade secrets. Patents and trade secrets are strongly intertwined—as 
can be seen from the 1985 UNCTAD definition of technology transfer, which focuses on the 
transfer of systematic knowledge to enable the manufacture of a product. If innovators chose 
to rely on trade secrets they can control their innovation permanently, so long as the 
information remains secret.120 This raises a number of questions. On the one hand, trade 
secrets provide greater protection in the sense that protection does not expire after a set term, 
as patents do when they expire. There are also rules regarding the extent to which there is 
disclosure of the invention (and in the United States, through disclosure of the best mode), 
thus suggesting that patents do make a contribution to the public dissemination of 
innovation.121 On the other hand, the trade secret owner runs the risk that a competitor either 
independently develops the same or similar technology or derives it through reverse 
engineering. Once this occurs, the trade secret owner loses the ability to control the 
technology itself. 
 
It should be borne in mind, however, that often an innovation cannot be used effectively 
unless patents, know how and information are all transferred. It is important, therefore, to 
develop a solution which includes both patents and information when considering technology 
                                                
116 See Scottish Government Press Release http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Releases/2008/12/02082120. 
117 http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Business-Industry/Energy/Action/leading/saltire-prize. 
118 See also Geroski, footnote 22 
119 See website http://www.virgin.com/subsites/virginearth/ and discussion on launch at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/09/AR2007020900693.html 
120 A useful example of the interface between the two fields is the English decision Pall Corp v Commercial 
Hydraulics (Bedford) Ltd [1990] F.S.R. 329; see also Carty, H. ‘An analysis of the modern action for breach of 
commercial confidence: when is protection merited?’ I.P.Q. 2008, 4, 416-455 
121 See p16. 
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transfer; but also to avoid a system which imposes such restrictions on patents that an 
innovator may be tempted to choose to rely exclusively on trade secrets—and thus, 
potentially, permanent and private control of the information, which undermines the 
information dissemination goal which the patent system perpetuates.  
 
Other forms of encouraging innovation can be learnt from diverse and individual activities 
carrying on throughout the world, where IP and control of information is not sought.122 
Lessons may also be learnt from approaches taken to biotechnology and traditional 
knowledge, which will be explored more as this project progresses.123 In isolation, these 
initiatives will not change the face of innovation; however the introduction of wider forms of 
innovation generation and onward transfer of technology, such as under the umbrella of the 
Technology Innovation for Sustainable Societies, may aid this process.124  
 
It should also be borne in mind that most innovations cannot be put in a box, sent elsewhere, 
and used there with success. The demands of one country differ from another: more wind, 
fewer people, less money, different levels of expertise and technical know how, and varying 
regulatory regimes. If planning permission cannot be obtained or the tax incentive schemes 
are not efficiently attractive, then even free and effective technology may not be put in place 
in a country.  
 
Funding 
 
There may be a range of forms of encouraging innovation and transferring the results. Yet the 
question frequently returns to money. In 2010, the need for more investment in private 
companies working with climate change technologies has been the subject of press comment 
                                                
122 See for example the Technology Innovation for Sustainable Societies’ Berkeley-Darfur Project: 
http://darfurstoves.org/. This initiative seeks to provide fuel-efficient stoves which reduce fire-wood 
requirements. 
123 See discussion in Morgera, E. and Tsioumani, E. ‘The evolution of benefit-sharing: linking biodiversity and 
community livelihoods’ 19:2 Review of European Community and International Environmental Law 
(forthcoming 2010). For details of the debate relating to the role of IP regarding the work of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity in relation to access to genetic resources, see report of the resumed ninth meeting of the Ad 
Hoc Open-ended Working Group on Access and Benefit-sharing (ABS) of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD) was held from 10-16 July 2010, in Montreal, Canada, of the International Centre for Trade and 
Sustainable Development ‘Bridges Trade BioRes’ 19 July 2010 http://ictsd.org/i/trade-and-sustainable-
development-agenda/81017/ and Earth Negotiations Bulletin 19 July 2010 
http://www.iisd.ca/vol09/enb09527e.html. Note the EU proposal to add reference to ‘the importance of genetic 
resources for … climate change adaptation’ in the context of a provision on access for non-commercial research 
and in emergency situations. 
124 See footnote 122.  
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and wide discussion.125 The lack of clarity regarding the future policy of the United States in 
relation to climate change also is said to be a deterrent to investors.126 If there is no IP, or 
there are more limits on IP, would a potential investor feel assured of its ability to control the 
technology, without a competitor able to reproduce it more cheaply, given that the other need 
not seek to recover the investment costs? For this reason, venture capitalists see the obtaining 
and protection of IP as being at the heart of any technology investment.127 In addition to 
venture capital funds, there are initiatives such as the Co-operative Bank’s £200million green 
energy vow which provides funds to assist businesses in engaging in environmentally 
sustainable activities. It is unclear what stance will be taken to any IP.128 Prizes, discussed 
above, are also relevant here.  
 
When considering funding options, there is again the question of a holistic approach. How 
readily can businesses pursue these opportunities? For example, does the security sought by 
the banks impose a great burden on businesses (eg a mortgage over the entire farm), such that 
the farmer will not chose to pursue a project such as the generation of bio-gas from waste 
(say, on a small part of the farm)? These positions may seem reasonable from the perspective 
of both the banks and the farmer—but they lead to a lack of action and the contribution to 
responding to climate change (albeit likely minimal) which would have come about if one 
particular project had been pursued.129 If a government wishes to encourage new technologies 
in responding to climate change, then steps should be taken to make it much easier for 
investors to invest and businesses to accept. 
 
Towards a (really) holistic approach 
 
Thus the attitude of venture capitalists, banks, and IP owners might be less important than a 
collaborative (state and private) and collective (global and national) stance to addressing 
climate change. This stance would need to involve individuals, states (who pass regulations 
and legislation, provide some funding, and have international treaty responsibilities), 
                                                
125 Eg The Guardian (19 August 2010) regarding PV Crystalox Solar 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/aug/19/pv-crystalox-solar-energy-profits-slump and the Scottish Low 
Carbon Investment Conference held in Edinburgh in September 2010 http://www.slciconference.com/.  
126 See Reuters comment (11August 2010) 
 http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE67A3JK20100811. 
127 See p25 
128 For details see http://www.thenews.coop/news/Wider%20Co-op%20Movement/1779  
129 See discussion of some of these points in ‘Incentives for generating renewable energy’ (April 2010) 
http://www.greenwisebusiness.co.uk/resources/incentives-for-generating-renewable-energy-6.aspx. 
 28  
international bodies, investors, businesses and IP owners—with a focus less on control and 
mandatory limits on it, and more on partnership.  
 
As has been seen, obligations, other than those relating to IP, do already exist in relation to 
states—in relation to human rights and through the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol. There are 
systems in place in the UNFCCC to encourage more collaboration, such as flexibility 
mechanisms which can engage private companies in the climate change effort130 and which 
allow countries to lower the costs of achieving emissions targets by accessing opportunities 
in countries where it is most cost effective to do so.131 With IP rights being more firmly 
placed in the private sector, from the IP side it will be a question of whether or not private 
businesses will share technologies (of different levels of importance) or choose to engage in 
practices which might not appear the most profitable in the short term. If a cogent reason can 
be provided for businesses to do this (such as medium- or long-term profitability, positive 
public relations or activities forming part of a corporate social responsibility programme, as is 
discussed below), there is greater prospect of action in the private sector, or by the private 
and state sectors together, than from the state acting alone.  
 
International bodies have been taking some steps to encourage greater activity by companies 
in this respect,132 for example through the UN Global Compact, which describes itself as ‘a 
strategic policy initiative for businesses that are committed to aligning their operations and 
strategies with ten universally accepted principles in the areas of human rights, labour, 
environment and anti-corruption.’133 In June 2010, the UN Global Compact Leaders Summit 
called for the crucial role of Governments in promoting corporate responsibility and engaging 
                                                
130See Kyoto Protocol, articles 3, 6(3) and 4, 12. See discussion in ‘Compilation and analysis of available 
information on the scope, effectiveness and functioning of the flexibility mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol. 
Note by the secretariat’ Poznan, December 2008 
http://unfccc.int/documentation/documents/advanced_search/items/3594.php?rec=j&priref=600004941#beg; 
Kulovesi, K.’The Private Sector and the Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol: Experiences, Challenges and 
Prospects’ (2007) 16 Review of European Community and International Environmental Law 145; and also see 
DIRECTIVE 2004/101/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 27 October 
2004 the Kyoto project-based mechanisms to the Community scheme, regarding the use of credits.  
131 See detail about other steps being taken between states in relation to sustainable development in Grosse 
Ruse-Khan, H. ‘A real partnership for development? Sustainable development as treaty objective in European 
economic partnership agreements and beyond’ J.I.E.L. 2010, 13(1), 139-180. See also de Sepibus, J. ‘Reforming 
the Clean Development Mechanism to Accelerate Technology Transfer’, NCCR Trade Regulation Working 
Paper 2009/42, Nov 2009  
132 See discussion in Morgera, E. (2009) Corporate Accountability in International Environmental Law Oxford 
University Press, UK 
133 http://www.unglobalcompact.org/. 
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the private sector in achieving the Millennium Development Goals.134 This group also issued 
a statement on climate change, although it does not refer to innovation.135 From the more 
corporate perspective, there have also been more arguments for more companies to engage in 
environmentally sustainable conduct, and report on it, as part of a corporate social 
responsibility programme. This can amount to a positive change in behaviour, rather than 
being mere window dressing.136 One example was the now completed UN Business Leaders’ 
Initiative on Human Rights,137 in which some large IP owning companies were involved; this 
initiative aimed to become the starting point for any businesses committed to taking the first 
steps in mapping human rights into their existing management systems—see, for example, 
the Novartis living wage commitment to its employees all over the world.138 Initiatives in this 
area continue, with a meeting held in Edinburgh in October 2010, led by the Scottish Human 
Rights Commission, which aims to lead to an Edinburgh Declaration on Business and Human 
Rights.139 
  
These initiatives, together with, say, Creative Commons, the Eco-Patent Commons or public-
private partnering arrangements suggest that new models could be developing of working 
with technology and practices, which could impact upon climate change. Regarding climate 
change and information data, consider also the collaborative work of the Global Spatial Data 
Infrastructure Association, comprising companies and universities. This seeks to promote 
international cooperation and collaboration in support of local, national and international 
spatial data infrastructure developments, to allow nations to better address social, economic, 
                                                
134 http://www.unglobalcompact.org/news/45-06-23-2010 
135 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issues_doc/Environment/climate/CARING_FOR_CLIMATE_STATEM
ENT_2010.pdf. Resources setting out existing and possible achievements in relation to the Global Compact are 
found at http://www.leaderssummit2010.org/sitecore/content/be-
bruga/leaderssummit2010/publications%20and%20multimedia.aspx. 
136 McBarnet, D. et al (eds) (2007) The New Corporate Accountability Corporate Social Responsibility and the 
Law Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK 
137 http://www.blihr.org/. 
138 For details see http://www.corporatecitizenship.novartis.com/people-communities/human-rights.shtml. 
139 See Miller, A. ‘Respecting human rights is the business of all our companies’ 3 October 2010 
http://thescotsman.scotsman.com/scotland/Allan-Miller-Respecting-human-rights.6562888.jp?articlepage=2; 
see also Scottish Human Rights Commission website http://scottishhumanrights.com/international/biennial. 
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and environmental issues of pressing importance.140 An example in relation to health is 
GlaxoSmithKline, the world’s second largest pharmaceutical drug company, which decided 
to donate details of patents and confidential data to the Malaria Consortium.141  
 
A range of contracts could be developed to service the new model. Businesses may choose to 
make some technologies more openly available as part of a pool like the Eco-Patent 
Commons—they could pledge a patent to the pool and not assert the patent against any 
implementers’ environmentally beneficial use of the pledged patent,142 but still relying on 
patent rights in relation to other activities. The question does of course arise as to whether or 
not businesses are likely to agree to donate their most important or profitable patents to such 
a pool.143 Other options could be a model following Creative Commons, with a set of licences 
ranging from the most basic- allowing people to copy and distribute your work provided they 
give you credit- to the more specific, which would prevent or allow for commercial uses of 
your work or modifications to it.144 This might work well with IP relating to software climate 
change information. Use could also be made of the UNCTAD Draft International Code of 
Conduct on Technology Transfer from 1985,145 which has been used as the base for some 
technology transfer contracts.146  
 
Another model would be to follow examples of public-private partnership models which have 
created incentives for partnerships that might not otherwise exist, given the lack of a more 
traditional market demand. Public entities or non-profit organisations may agree to provide 
funding or assume certain risks to stimulate an environment in which private firms can 
perform and be rewarded. The resulting product would then be able to be made accessible at 
                                                
140 The Global Spatial Data Infrastructure Association is an inclusive organization of organizations, agencies, 
firms and individuals from around the world. See http://www.gsdi.org/ and list of members and sponsors at 
http://www.gsdi.org/Mbrs_Spnsrs. 
141 For details see http://www.malariaconsortium.org/news/gsk_boost_to_malaria_fight.htm.  
142 See http://www.wbcsd.org/web/projects/ecopatent/EcoPatentGroundRules.pdf. 
143 Note press comment regarding patents pledged by DuPont in 2009 
http://www.wbcsd.org/Plugins/DocSearch/details.asp?DocTypeId=251&ObjectId=MzM3ODM.  
144 http://creativecommons.org/choose/. 
145 Also included in UNCTAD 2001 ‘Technology Transfer’ document. 
www.unctad.org/en/docs//psiteiitd28.en.pdf (see p 52 et seq). In 2001 the UNCTAD also produces a 
compendium of the bilateral, regional and international instruments which relate to technology transfer 
www.unctad.org/en/docs//psiteipcm5.en.pdf. 
146 See discussion in Raja, Vivek, Essential Clauses in a Transfer of Technology Contract—A Perspective of the 
Host Nation (April 30, 2010) available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1629300. 
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minimal costs. This model has been successful in relation to treatments for so-called 
‘neglected diseases.’147  
 
Suggestions for models of contracts and structures should be developed in collaboration with 
national and international bodies dealing with climate change and IP—eg the ongoing 
tripartite project between the European Patent Office, International Council for Trade and 
Sustainable Development and the UN Environmental Programme.148 It should also be 
ensured that the possible contractual models are as clear as possible, and take fairly into 
account the interests of stakeholders, do not conflict with the likely standard terms and 
conditions of banks and investors, take into account the subsidy and other regulatory systems 
and also ensure that the necessary skills and know-how, as well as IP, are transferred to 
ensure the successful operation of transferred technologies (in the widest sense) by the 
recipient. Within governments and business, there would need throughout to be liaison 
between those involved in innovation, funding, environmental protection and finance. If all of 
this does not occur, then this could mean that a new approach is not taken or would not 
operate effectively.149  
 
The proposal made so far for a holistic new legal and corporate approach to IP and sharing 
and regulation of innovation is worthy of further discussion. Yet it is clearly complicated. 
Could a more straightforward (yet still holistic) approach be sought now, within the existing 
legal regimes? 
  
A role for competition? 
 
Concerns about the power of IP owners can be phrased by reference to competition. Unlike 
IP and climate change, however, there is no international competition agreement. There are 
synergies between existing regional and national competition agreements,150 although as the 
BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) seek to develop their own competition law 
                                                
147 See eg Caines, K. (2004) ‘GHP Study Paper 4 Global Health Partnerships and Neglected Diseases’ DFID 
Health Resource Centre http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/development/docs/WHO_4.pdf. 
148 See details of project at http://ictsd.org/i/research/51361/ and 
http://www.epo.org/topics/news/2009/20090427.html; and September 2010 report 
http://ictsd.org/i/publications/85126/.  
149 See for instance, the conclusion in favour of an integrated approach to international climate policy-making in 
Roberts. J. and Parks, B. (2006) A Climate of Injustice: Global Inequality, North-South Politics, and Climate 
Policy MIT Press. 
150 See discussion in Marsden, P. (2003) A Competition Policy for the WTO Cameron May, London, UK 
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and economics, there is a view that there may in the future be more variety in approaches 
taken.151 Even when there are similar approaches taken, there will be a question of 
jurisdiction; for example, EU competition law will intervene only if the conduct in question 
has an impact on market in the EU; this can cover a global market, but not a situation where 
there is no global market and access is sought in a non-EU market. From this perspective, the 
manner of evolution of competition laws of developing countries, and the large BRIC 
economies, will be important.  
 
For now, several countries have legislation addressing abuse of market power or a dominant 
position. If an IP owner which has a significant degree of market power refuses to share 
technology, a competition regulator may require the IP owner to do so if particular 
circumstances exist. Generally speaking, the typical exercise of IP does not, in and of itself, 
raise competition concerns. Against this backdrop, the relevant circumstances for competition 
concerns to arise in relation to IP were found in the EU in relation to IMS v NDC and 
Microsoft152 and in the US, in Image Technical Services, Inc v Eastman Kodak Co153 
although a different approach was taken in In re Independent Service Organizations Antitrust 
Litigation (CSU).154 The area is governed by the general rules on a refusal to supply set out in 
Aspen Skiing, which was not an IP case.155  
 
The US Supreme Court has sought to limit the doctrine to when there is an existing 
relationship of supply.156 In the EU, case law suggests that refusal to licence will be an abuse 
of a dominant position only in ‘exceptional circumstances’, where the refusal prevents the 
development of a new product or technical development, for which there is unmet consumer 
demand in a (possibly hypothetical) other market, in respect of which there is a risk of 
elimination of viable competition and there is no objective justification for the refusal.157  
                                                
151 See eg the BRIC International Competition Conference held in 2009 http://www.bric-competition.com/. 
152 IMS Health GmbH & Co OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co KG (C418/01) [2004] All E.R. (EC) 813 [2004] 
E.C.R. I-5039; Commission Decision relating to a proceeding under article 82 of the EC Treaty (Case 
COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft) March 2004 Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37792/en.pdf and Microsoft Corp v Commission of the 
European Communities (T-201/04) [2007] 5 C.M.L.R. 11 
153 125 F 3d 11195 (9th Cir. 1997) 
154 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see generally US DoJ & FTC, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of 
Intellectual Property (1995) http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf. 
155 Aspen Skiing v Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp 472 U.S. 585 
156 Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 
157 Radio Telefis Eireann v Commission of the European Communities (C-241/91 P) [1995] E.C.R. I-743; IMS 
Health GmbH & Co OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co KG (C418/01) [2004] All E.R. (EC) 813 [2004] E.C.R. I-
5039 ; Microsoft Corp v Commission of the European Communities (T-201/04) [2007] 5 C.M.L.R. 11.  
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For this to be relevant in relation to access to technologies and climate change, the question 
of the importance of the technology again arises—here, in relation to market definition. 
Before an IP owner can be found to be in a dominant position in a market, and questions of 
abuse and refusal to share are considered, the market in which the IP exists must be defined. 
 
Market definition  
 
Similar approaches are taken to this in different regimes, with key questions being measuring 
demand and supply substitutability for the market for products or services and the geographic 
market definition, given a sufficient price change or incentive.158 Market definition can be 
viewed as at the heart of the question of access to essential technologies. Is the market 
‘technologies which can assist in addressing climate change’? If so, then there are many 
substitutes available—wind, wave, biogas, insulation. A wide definition might be supported 
by the fact that Governments do have some choices, under the flexibility mechanisms 
discussed above, as to how they choose to meet their obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. 
This might suggest that a wider definition of the market is appropriate. This in turn will make 
it less likely that any one patent owner will be in a dominant position in such a wide 
market.159 
 
On the other hand, a company might choose to exploit its local infrastructure and climate eg 
is there a natural resource such as wave or wind? Both are present in Scotland. Yet if a 
company chooses to trade in wind, and wishes access to a patent in relation to wind 
technologies, then the fact that the company could move to wave and utilise other natural 
resources will not mean that wind technologies are part of the same market as wave 
technologies. For this, it would need to be shown that the same expertise and infrastructure 
could be used to move from one to the other—unlikely so. If, however, there are different 
technologies for working within one sector to which suppliers and customers could readily 
adapt—eg within different forms of tidal technologies, then these may be part of the same 
market. Yet it does not follow that all products within one sector are necessarily part of the 
                                                
158 See Commission Notice on the definition of the relevant market for the purposes of Community competition 
law O.J. C 372/03 9.12.1997 
159 The key question is can an entity act to an appreciable extent independently of the other, without a reaction 
by consumers—eg by moving to another supplier. See United Brands Co v Commission of the European 
Communities (27/76) 1978] E.C.R. 207, para 65.  
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same market; again, the substitutability analysis must be carried out. For example, .in the 
wave sector, shoreline technologies160 differ from near shore technologies,161 and both of 
these differ from deep water technologies.162  
 
This analysis suggests that from the competition perspective, several markets may exist under 
the broad umbrella of responding to climate change. Within these markets, competition law 
may be able to play a role, where the ‘exceptional circumstances’ noted above exist, in 
requiring greater sharing of, say, a wave technology within a distinct market which comprises 
only wave technology. It may also have a wider impact if there is a significant new 
technology, adaptation technology or controlling of information, which can be found to be 
markets in themselves.  
  
Abuse and its consequences 
 
Even if a market is narrowly defined, or can include a suite of patents, and a patent owner is 
in a dominant position, a finding of abuse for refusing to share technology will be made 
rarely. Applying the tests discussed above in the climate change context, there may often be 
no previous relationship, there are as yet no formal or de facto standards163 and what is 
sought might be access to the existing key technology, rather than access to it to build a new 
one or new product development.  
 
If the tests were met, then the Microsoft (and IMS)164 decisions in the EU suggest that if there 
is a finding of abuse, the IP owner will be required to license the IP on ‘fair reasonable and 
non discriminatory (FRAND) terms. The meaning of FRAND in an individual case remains 
to be determined. It is interesting to note that there could be parallels between this and the 
Convention on Biological Diversity’s provision165 regarding access to and transfer of 
technology on fair and most favourable terms—although in the context of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, such terms are subject to being ‘mutually agreed.’ This will also be 
explored further in the project.  
                                                
160 Eg the Limpet of Wavegen http://www.wavegen.co.uk/what_we_offer_limpet.htm. 
161 Eg the Oyster of Aquamarine Power http://www.aquamarinepower.com/technologies/. 
162 Eg the Pelamis of Pelamis Wave http://www.pelamiswave.com/our-technology/pelamis-wec. 
163 See p8 
164 IMS Health GmbH & Co OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co KG (C418/01) [2004] All E.R. (EC) 813 [2004] 
E.C.R. I-5039, see footnote 157. 
165See http://www.cbd.int/convention/convention.shtml, article 16(2) and footnote 123.  
 35  
 
For refusal to share to be abuse when access is sought to an existing essential technology 
which will merely be reproduced, and not developed or made into something new, a new 
approach to ‘exceptional circumstances’ would be required. There is some support for this in 
the EU in early decisions and also in the decision of the European Commission in Microsoft, 
which calls for all relevant matters to be taken into account, rather than a more rigid and 
structured test.166  
 
Other roles for competition 
 
Arguments have also been made in the US and in the EU167 that it can be in breach of 
competition law to fail to disclose the ownership of a patent in relation to a formal 
standard168—fixed by say an international organisation such as the ITU, as is discussed 
above, by a private industry group such as the ETSI169 or the W3C170—or to license the 
patent on FRAND terms. There have been no decided cases on this issue by courts.171  
 
A role for competition may also be found in relation to concerns expressed regarding so-
called ‘patent trolls’. The ‘troll’ is a fairly new and unclear term. It is one which could 
arguably be applied to any IP owner who seeks to enforce or assert its exclusivity, the very 
purpose of IP rights; it is becoming increasingly used, however, in relation to non practising 
entities. These bodies either buy patents and then charge fees for others to license them 
(rather than making or developing the invention themselves); or obtain patents with a broad 
                                                
166 See IMS Health GmbH & Co OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co KG (C418/01) [2004] All E.R. (EC) 813 
[2004] E.C.R. I-5039 para 38—the tests were ‘sufficient’—not necessary; Volvo AB v Erik Veng (UK) Ltd 
(238/87) [1988] E.C.R. 6211 para 8 and Commission Decision relating to a proceeding under article 82 of the 
EC Treaty (Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft) March 2004 paras 555-558  
167 In the Matter of Rambus, Inc.Docket No. 9302 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9302/060802commissionopinion.pdf and Rambus Inc v Federal Trade 
Commission 522 F.3d 456 
168 For discussion of the relationship between IP and standards, see Lemley, M. ‘Intellectual Property Rights and 
Standard Setting Organizations’ California Law Review, Vol. 90, p. 1889, 2002 and see also p8 
169 http://www.etsi.org/WebSite/homepage.aspx. 
170 http://www.w3.org/. 
171Rambus Inc v Federal Trade Commission 522 F.3d 456 found there to have been no breach of antitrust law. 
The appeals court rejected an application for a further appeal on 26 August 2008 see Reuters ‘U.S. trade 
commission loses bid for Rambus appeal’ 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/rbssTechMediaTelecomNews/idUKN2748830020080827. 
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scope of protection and then license them to others to see if there is a marketplace, thus 
incurring only opportunity costs and the initial patent application/maintenance fees.172 
  
The focus on the development of climate change technologies driven partly by the Kyoto 
Protocol and ongoing UNFCCC work on technology transfer, could lead to non practising 
entities seeking to acquire a suite of patents related to climate change—both within and 
across industries, eg some relating to wind and some to cement. If such an entity were to 
refuse to license its patents, and thereby fail to work the invention in the marketplace, 
solutions to this might lie within patent law itself. Article 5A of the Paris Convention 
provides that states can introduce compulsory licensing where there is insufficient working of 
an invention—but this applies only after three years from grant.173  
 
In the early period after grant, therefore, there could be an important role for competition law 
if such acts result in an abuse of market power. This may be so if overly high licence fees are 
sought or refusals are made in respect of each of the suite, when isolated refusals or requests 
in relation of each of the patents would not have raised competition concerns. Yet it is not 
clear to what extent such a scenario will arise, in light of the significant incentives that non-
practising entities have to license their technology. This will be considered in more detail as 
the project progresses. 
 
Competition questions can also arise when partnerships are reached, just as suggested by the 
proposal above. Competition law is concerned about agreements being reached by players in 
a market.174 In the past, competition regulators in the USA and the EU did not accept that it 
could be in the interests of competition for there to be exclusive licensing of IP.175 The 
current regimes accept that licensing of IP can be in the interests of competition.176 In the EU 
                                                
172 See discussion in McDonough, J. ‘The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of the Function of 
Patent Trolls in an Idea Economy’ Emory Law Journal, Vol. 56, p. 189, 2006 and Ng, E.S.K. ‘Patent Trolling: 
Innovation at Risk’ E.I.P.R. 2009, 31(12), 593-608.  
173 For the text of article 5A Paris Convention, see 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/trtdocs_wo020.html#P123_15283. For discussion of the approach to 
this adopted by the UK, see MacQueen et al (2010) Contemporary Intellectual Property Law and Policy OUP, 
UK, paras 11.143, 21.40-21.43. Note also article 31 TRIPS, see p11,13,16.  
174 See eg Article 101 Treaty on Functioning of the European Union.  
175 See The ‘Nine No Nos’ of the 1970s set out by Bruce B. Wilson, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, 
Antitrust Division, before the Michigan State Bar Antitrust Law Section, September 21, 1972 
http://www.cptech.org/cm/ninenonos.html, in the EC Regulation 240/96 of 31 January 1996 on the application 
of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to certain categories of technology transfer agreements OJ L 31, 9.2.1996  
176 Regulation (EC) on the application of article 81(3) of the Treaty at categories of technology transfer 
agreements No. 772/2004 Official Journal L 123, 27.04.2004, pages 11-17 and Commission Notice Guidelines 
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again, it should also be borne in mind that draft Guidelines were issued in 2010 on Horizontal 
Cooperation Agreements. These suggest that environmental benefit is to be a relevant 
(although unlikely a decisive) factor when considering competition questions.177 These 
factors combine to suggest that if there was to be greater use of partnership, competition may 
not object.  
 
State Aid 
 
A further issue to be explored is state aid. The UK may decide that it would encourage 
greater use of wave or wind power and impose more subsidies or incentives, eg Feed In 
Tariffs introduced in the UK in April 2010,178 or the UK might fund prizes as discussed 
above in relation to carbon capture storage. There is also an argument that the state should 
purchase essential patents and then license these in its country, and exchange or cross license 
patents to other states which have taken a similar approach.179 But would this be consistent 
with EU competition law regarding state aid?180 These points will also be explored further in 
the project.  
 
Conclusion 
 
We are at the start of an exciting journey. There is a need for a wide and holistic 
consideration of the importance of IP, and different types of technology, in responding to 
climate change. This project has sought to provide an initial discussion. It will introduce 
further new perspectives as it proceeds, in the first instance through a second meeting of 
experts in Edinburgh on 10 December 2010. In addition to the new fields referred to in this 
working paper, regard should also be had to the possible contributions to be made by the 
                                                                                                                                                  
on the application of article 81 of the EC Treaty to technology transfer agreements O.J. C 101, 27.04.2004, 
pages 2-42 and US Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing 
of Intellectual Property (1995) available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.htm and see 
footnote 154.  
177 In the EU, Draft Guidelines on Horizontal Co-operation Agreements (May, 2010) 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2010_horizontals/guidelines_en.pdf paras 300, 319 
178 http://www.fitariffs.co.uk/. 
179 See discussion in See discussion in Derclaye, E. ‘Not Only Innovation but also Collaboration, Funding, 
Goodwill and Commitment: Which Role for Patent Laws in Post-Copenhagen Climate Change Action’ 9 
J.Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 657 (2010). 
180 In the EU, see Community Rules on State Aid for Environmental Protection (2008/C 82/01) http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:082:0001:0033:EN:PDF. 
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interfaces between economics and innovation, economics and geosciences and labour and 
employment questions.  
 
Although there is an important role for high level scrutiny involving academics, practitioners 
and international organisations, there is also a need for clear and workable solutions which 
can be used—and which can be used now, without too much of a burden being placed on 
business and international institutions. Based on our initial discussions, a possible solution 
has three main strands: 
  
-enabling patents to be obtained more quickly and clearly to assist businesses and investment 
which continue to be based in IP;  
 
-encouraging greater exploration, though government agencies, international bodies and other 
organisations, of forms of encouraging and disseminating innovation which are not based in 
IP, and providing umbrella means of supporting them; and 
 
-a greater willingness to share essential or important IP when it is sought. This could be 
explored under the auspices of Corporate Social Responsibility and also form part of a wide 
collaborative programme.  
 
Some also have suggested seeking a declaration in a range of international fora that if there is 
an essential technology that this should be shared to all who wish it through FRAND, through 
a state or group of states buying technology and then making it available free of charge, or 
indeed, that it should be made available to all free of charge. Others, however, caution that 
such a declaration or declarations would be counter-productive, leading to yet more political 
debate between politically irreconcilable ideologies and diverting resources from more 
pragmatic solutions.  
 
Each of these points remains at a preliminary stage. We hope to develop these throughout the 
rest of the project and provide a wide, yet workable, suggestion(s) for ensuring greater access 
to and development of technologies, of all kinds, within their wider regulatory, market and 
funding frameworks, which can assist in responding to climate change. All of the proposals 
are ambitious—yet a strong message is that action is required; and the existing parallel 
approaches can and should be improved. 
